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SCHIFFER’S PUZZLE:  




In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning,’ Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects 
of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature.1A 
proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition “the 
entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to 
think of [the relevant object] in different ways” (129).2 But as no Fregean or Russellian proposition 
can possibly have such a feature, we must either (i) give up on these traditional theories of 
propositional content in favor of an account that can allow for the relativity feature, or else (ii) 
explain why the things we believe, and say, oftentimes seem to have this feature even though they, in 
fact, do not. Schiffer pursues the former option; in what follows, I pursue the latter.  
 
1 ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’ was published in an excellent, but difficult to obtain 
volume edited by J. Branquinho entitled Conteúdo e Cognição. Anais da série de seminários de Filosofia Analítica in 
2005. It is a true shame that Schiffer’s paper is not more widely known, and more easily accessible. Like all of 
Schiffer’s work in the theory of meaning and content, it deserves careful study from anyone with even a 
passing interest in these topics. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references will be to this work. 
2 Schiffer later ‘tightens’ this characterization as follows:   
 
A proposition p has the relativity feature iff p is an x-dependent proposition such that there are properties 
F and Y and ways of thinking w and w' of x such that (i) w ¹ w', (ii) a person who has F can entertain p 
only if she thinks of x in way w, and (iii) a person who has Y can only entertain p if he thinks of x in way 
w'. (134) 
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 The particular response to the puzzle posed by the relativity feature that I will sketch is one 
that I suspect Schiffer himself might have once been tempted to make; a response that will (I hope) 
be of interest to any theorist sympathetic to the view that the contents of our beliefs are fine-
grained, Fregean propositions.3 To be clear, however, my goal in trying to explain away the relativity 
feature is not to vindicate the traditional Fregean account of content and communication: like 
Schiffer, I believe that account to be problematic. As we will see, even if we assume the metaphysical 
thesis that believing is fundamentally a relation between agents and Fregean propositions, there is 
considerable pressure for denying that such propositions are either the contents of our assertoric 
speech acts, or the things we refer to, or specify, by that-clauses in belief-reports. In response to 
Schiffer’s puzzle the proponent of the Fregean metaphysics of beliefs should, I argue, hold that that 
the things we assert, and the referents of that-clauses, are not Fregean propositions, but rather kinds 
thereof.  
 
1. The Relativity Feature 
If I sincerely and literally utter (1), I will have said that I am hungry, and, in so doing, made manifest 
a certain belief of mine—a belief I would report using (3): 
 
 1. I am hungry. 
 2. By uttering (1), I said that I am hungry. 
 3. I believe that I am hungry.  
 
 
The complications that lead Schiffer to this refinement will not concern us in what follows, and, as such, we 
can stick to his formulation of the relativity feature in the text.   
3 In particular, the view that I will suggest is motivated, in large part, by Schiffer’s work in the late 70s and 




If you understand my utterance, you will entertain what I said. Supposing you are prepared to take 
my word on the matter, you will come to have a certain belief regarding me as well—a belief that I 
would report using (4): 
 
 4. You believe that I am hungry. 
 
Prima facie, there is something—namely, that I am hungry—that I said by uttering (1), and that we 
both believe. We can start to appreciate Schiffer’s puzzle by trying to get clearer on what, exactly, 
this ‘something’ is.   
 Proponents of the face-value theory will agree that the ‘something’ in question is a 
proposition—an abstract, mind- and language-independent entity that has truth-conditions 
essentially and without relativization to anything else.4 According to these theorists, both 
propositional attitude reports and reports of assertoric speech acts express relations between agents 
and propositions referred to, or specified by, that-clauses. More specifically, a face-value theorist is 
committed to the following two (interrelated, but separable) theses: 
 
The Semantic Thesis:  In a literal utterance of a report of the form ‘S believes/says that p’ the 
that-clause functions as a referential singular term, the semantic value of which is a proposition, 
the report being true just in case the proposition is something S believes or asserts.5  
 
 
4 See Schiffer (2003), Chapter 1, for some of the motivations for the face-value view.  
5 Here, and throughout, I am using ‘believes’ as the paradigmatic cognitive attitude and ‘saying’ and ‘meaning’ 
for the paradigmatic speech act verbs that take that-clauses as arguments.   
 4 
The Metaphysical Thesis:  Believing, saying, and meaning are genuinely propositional attitudes—
relations between agents and propositions.  
 
If these theses are correct, the says-that report in (2) is true just in case I stand in the saying-relation 
to the proposition specified by ‘that I am hungry’ (at the context); likewise, the belief report in (4) is 
true if, and only if, you stand in the belief relation to that same proposition.  
 Let’s provisionally follow the face-value theorist in accepting both of the foregoing theses, and 
that the that-clause in (2)–(4) specifies the proposition that I said by uttering (1). Now supposing the 
‘something’ in question is a proposition specified by the relevant that-clause, we would still like to 
know what kind of proposition it is.  
 Though proponents of the face-value theory might disagree among themselves regarding any 
number of further issues, they will (or at least should) agree that in (1)–(4) the proposition in 
question is an object-dependent proposition—a proposition the truth conditions of which can only be 
specified by mentioning the particular object(s) that it concerns. Plausibly, what I said in uttering (1) 
is something true at a world w just in case, at w, Ray Buchanan has the property of being hungry.  
 So far, so good. Things start to get puzzling, however, when we notice that—seemingly—in 
order for me to believe, or entertain, that I am hungry it is not enough for me merely to have a 
thought concerning some individual that happens to be me (perhaps, a thought concerning that guy 
in the mirror across from me in the restaurant that I do not recognize to be me). Rather, I must 
think of myself as such—that is, in a distinctively first-person, self-conscious way, a way that neither 
you nor anyone else can think of me. Insofar as this object-dependent proposition that I am hungry 
seems to require me, but not you, to think of me in a first-person way, it has what Schiffer calls the 
relativity feature.  
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 The relativity feature also seems to be exhibited by just about any utterance involving a 
demonstrative. Suppose that on your suggestion I am visiting our favorite local art gallery to check 
out a new sculpture entitled D’Odeurs et de Chatouilles. While standing in front of the sculpture, I call 
you and say: 
 
 5. That sculpture is magnificent!  
 
Supposing that I am speaking literally, and being sincere in so doing, I will have both said and 
expressed my belief that that sculpture is magnificent—a belief that you share. Plausibly, what I said, and 
what we both believe, is an object-dependent proposition concerning a particular sculpture, s. Prima 
facie, in order for me to believe, or even entertain, that proposition I must think of s under an 
occurrent perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation, but not so for you: if anything, you must 
think of s under a memory-based mode of presentation, since you are not at the moment positioned 
to see it. Hence, what I said in uttering (5), and what we both believe, seems to have the relativity 
feature.  
 The foregoing two examples are cases in which different agents (seemingly) must think of 
the same object in different ways in order to entertain a certain object-dependent proposition. There 
are, however, also cases in which we seem to have an object-dependent proposition, concerning 
some specific object o, that requires the same agent, at different times or places, to think of o under 
different ‘modes of presentation’ (more about this possibility momentarily). 
In presenting such an example, we would do well to first get a little bit clearer on what we 
might call the semantic content of an utterance, and how that relates to ‘what is said.’ Following 
Schiffer, let’s take the context-invariant meaning, or character*, of a sentence-type s to be a constraint 
on “what a speaker must mean in uttering [s], if she’s to be speaking literally” (131), a constraint 
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that we might, in turn, think of as a propositional ‘form,’ or propositional-type.6 For example, by 
uttering (6), I might mean both (i) that David is not ready for our dance party, and (ii) that we 
should postpone the dance party for one more round of drinks: 
 
 6. David isn’t ready.  
 
But though I meant (ii) by uttering (6), we should have no temptation to claim that this is something 
I stated, or literally meant by uttering (6). Intuitively, (i) ‘fits,’ or is ‘consonant with’ the character* of 
the sentence-type displayed in (6) in a way that (ii) is not. Following Schiffer, let’s say that when the 
meaning of the sentence s is a proposition-type Y, and a speaker S means some proposition q of 
the type Y in an unembedded utterance of s, then q is the semantic content of S’s utterance of s 
(131). Moreover, let’s also follow Schiffer in holding that if q is the semantic content of S’s utterance 
of s, then, necessarily, q is among the things S said by s. Note that it does not follow from the fact 
that the speaker can truly be reported as having said that p by uttering s, that p is the semantic 
content of that utterance. For example, in a conversation in which it is mutual knowledge between 
me and you that David is wearing sneakers, I might truly report the bouncer as having said that that 
David will not be let in to the club, by uttering (7): 
 
 7. No one wearing sneakers will be let in the club. 
 
though that is not the semantic content of his utterance. We should allow that even if “p is the 
semantic content of a speaker’s utterance, the speaker may be correctly reported as having said 
 
6 See Schiffer (2003) for more on characters*. See Bach (1994), Buchanan (2012), and Neale (2004) for more 
on proposition-types, -templates, or “forms.”  
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another proposition q, if q is appropriately related to p, where there is more than one way of being 
‘appropriately related.’” (131). In uttering (7), I correctly reported the bouncer as having said both 
that no one wearing sneakers will be let in the club and that David will not be let in the club, but 
only the former is the semantic content of his utterance. 
 With these distinctions in hand, now consider the following case. Suppose that we get an 
email from the secretary of our distinguished colleague and X-Phi enthusiast, Pergola, in which he 
explains to us why Pergola will be unable to attend the faculty meeting scheduled for later this 
afternoon. It reads:  
 
 8. Professor Pergola is conducting experiments in the university cafeteria today.  
 
It is plausible that the semantic content of (8) is an object-dependent proposition concerning, 
among other things, a particular day, d (a proposition that we could express tomorrow by uttering 
‘Professor Pergola was conducting experiments in the university yesterday’). But notice that if we 
read Pergola’s email today, we have to think of d as such in order to entertain, or believe, that object-
dependent proposition—that we must think of d as (roughly) this very day, the day it is now. Supposing 
we re-read the email tomorrow we can, of course, entertain that same object-dependent proposition 
expressed by (8) once again. Seemingly, in order to entertain what Pergola’s assistant expressed 
yesterday would now require us to think of d as, roughly, the day before this very day. Since the object-
dependent proposition expressed by (8) is such that it requires agents to think of the referent of 
‘today’ in different ways, at different times, it too seems to have Schiffer’s relativity feature.  
 Each of the foregoing examples seems to dramatically exhibit the relativity feature, and it is 
easy to construct others. Schiffer claims that “the relativity feature can be had by the semantic 
content of an utterance involving almost any kind of singular term” (134). If the relativity feature is 
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in fact a property of the semantic content of any utterance, then it is plausibly a property of many, if 
not most. Crucially, however, if the relativity feature is ever instantiated then both the Fregean and 
Direct-reference versions of the face-value account are incorrect.  
 
2. Direct Reference and the Relativity Feature 
 Qua face-value theorists, Direct-Reference theorists and Fregeans each accept both the semantic 
thesis, and the metaphysical thesis. Moreover, they are agreed that the objects of our beliefs, and the 
contents of our assertoric speech acts are structured propositions in that they are complexes with 
constituents, the identity and arrangement of which are determinative of their truth-conditions. They 
differ, however, in their respective views as to the nature of these propositional constituents. While 
the Direct-Reference theorist holds that a proposition is composed of the objects, properties, and 
relations that figure in its truth-conditions, the Fregean holds that it is composed of modes of 
presentation thereof. In this section, we will consider the relativity feature in the context of the Direct 
Reference account, in the next, in the context of the Fregean account.  
 A Direct-Reference (DR) theorist is any proponent of the face-value theory that holds that 
(i) the propositions we believe and assert are Russellian propositions—structured complexes of 
objects, properties, and relations, and (ii) the propositional contribution of a referring expression is 
exhausted by its referent; the propositional contribution of a predicate, the property it expresses. I 
will assume that this view, and the motivations for it forthcoming from the work of Kaplan, Salmon, 
Soames, and others are, more or less, familiar.  
 Returning to our initial example of (1)–(4), the DR theorist will hold that the semantic 
content of my utterance of (1) is, to a first approximation, a singular, Russellian proposition that has 
me, Ray Buchanan, as a constituent, as well as the property expressed by ‘is hungry’: 
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 1*.  <Ray Buchanan, the property of being hungry> 
 
The DR theorist will also claim that this singular proposition is the referent of the that-clause in 
both (2) and (4), and, hence, both something I said, and something we both believe. Similarly, (1*) 
will also be claimed to be the semantic content of my literal utterances (9) and (10):  
 
 9. That guy is hungry. [Demonstrating myself in a mirror] 
 10. Ray Buchanan is hungry. 
 
While the sentence-types displayed (9) and (10) might differ in character* from that displayed in (1), 
any utterance thereof will, according to the DR theorist, semantically express one and the same 
singular proposition. Further, the DR theorist will claim that, if I believe the semantic content of my 
utterance of (1), I thereby believe what is expressed by my utterances of (9) and (10) as well. 
Consequently, given that (3) is true, so too is (11):  
  
 3. I believe that I am hungry.  
 11. I believe that Ray Buchanan is hungry 
 
If the that-clauses in (3) and (11) refer to the same singular proposition, these reports cannot diverge 
in truth-value.  
 As should already be clear, a singular proposition such as (1*) does not have the relativity 
feature. Insofar as (11) might be true even if I believe that I am not Ray (perhaps, I am suffering 
from amnesia), the singular proposition (1*) does not have the relativity feature. But if the DR 
theorist is correct, that proposition just is the proposition I believe if (3) is true. As such, the DR 
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theorist must hold that what I said by uttering (1), and what we both believe if (3) and (4) are true, 
does not, and cannot, have the relativity feature (137). It takes little ingenuity to see that, more 
generally, no Russellian proposition—singular, or otherwise—can have the relativity feature.  
 As Schiffer points out, the DR theorist can explain away the appearance of the relativity 
feature only if she can explain away the very familiar worries for her view posed by Frege’s puzzle 
(138). For example, the belief-reports in (3) and (11) can, intuitively, differ in truth-value, despite the 
predictions of the DR account to the contrary (again, I might have undergone amnesia and forgotten 
that I am Ray Buchanan). Accounting for the mismatch between her theory’s predictions and the 
intuitions of competent speakers regarding the truth-conditions of belief-reports such as (3) and (11) 
is only part of the challenge faced by the DR theorist. To appreciate one especially pressing such 
further worry, suppose that while we are at the restaurant, I mistake the mirror just to our left for a 
clear window. Gesturing towards a man in the mirror that I do not recognize to be me, I sincerely, 
literally, and competently utter (12): 
 
 12. I do not believe that he is hungry, but I believe that I am hungry.  
 
For the DR theorist, however, (12) is an explicit contradiction, equivalent to (13): 
 
 13. I do not believe that I am hungry, but I believe that I am hungry. 
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The DR theorist must explain not only how it is possible for an utterance such as (13) to be literally 
true, she must also make it plausible that a competent, reflective speaker might rationally assert such a 
contradiction (138). This is no easy task.7 
 Like Schiffer, I am skeptical that the DR theorist can ultimately give a plausible response to 
the problems posed by Frege-cases, and, as such, that she can explain away the appearance of the 
relativity feature either. For now, I will follow Schiffer in taking it as a working hypothesis that the 
apparent counter-examples are genuine and that, as such, direct-reference semantics “can’t be part 
of any correct way of explaining away the relativity feature” (139). Moreover, I will further assume 
that the difficulties facing the DR-theorists show that the truth-conditions of belief-reports such as 
(13) are, in some sense, and in some cases, ‘sensitive’ to the modes of presentation under which an agent 
thinks of the objects and properties which her belief concerns. In the meanwhile, I encourage fans 
of direct reference semantics to be patient—the view I will eventually sketch in response to 
Schiffer’s puzzle has the wherewithal to reconstruct singular, Russellian propositions when, and 
where, we might find a need for them.  
 
3. Fregeans and the Relativity Feature 
In contrast to the DR theorist, Fregeans hold that the propositional objects of our beliefs and the 
contents of our assertions must be individuated in terms of the modes of presentation under which we 
think of the objects, properties, and relations that figure in their truth-conditions. According to the 
Fregean, an agent might (rationally) have multiple beliefs to the effect that a particular object x is F 
which nevertheless differ in propositional content. A Fregean can allow, for example, that Lois 
 
7  For some further worries regarding DR accounts of content see Schiffer (1987b), (1992), and (2006). For 
some DR-responses to Schiffer (2006), see Braun (2006) and Salmon (2006), as well as Schiffer’s most recent 
response to Salmon (this volume).   
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Lane’s belief that Superman lives in Metropolis can (contra the DR-theorist) differ in content from 
her belief that Clark Kent lives in Metropolis (which in turn, might differ in content from her belief 
that that guy on TV lives in Metropolis, even if that guy is Superman/Clark). Likewise, a Fregean 
can, and will, claim that I might truly utter ‘I do not believe that he is hungry, but I believe that I am 
hungry’ so long as the two that-clauses refer to distinct modes of presentation (MOP) involving 
propositions. This is a good thing. 
 While Fregean accounts come in many varieties, these theorists will agree—or at least should 
agree—that whatever else MOPs might be, they must meet the following two constraints:    
 
 Frege’s Constraint: Necessarily, if m is a MOP under which a minimally rational person x believes 
a thing to be F, then it is not the case that x also believes y not to be F under m. If x believes y 
to be F and also believes y not to be F, then there are distinct MOPs m and m' such that x 
believes y to be F under m and disbelieves y to be F under m'.  
 
 The Criterion of Sameness: If m is a complete MOP, then one cannot have two beliefs such that 
(1) both are beliefs that a thing x is F under m, and such that the two beliefs differ in internal 
functional role. (Schiffer 1978: 180–1) 
 
Here, the functional role of a belief is intended to pick out what we might call the ‘internal’ functional 
profile of a belief state—i.e., the relations, actual and counterfactual, which that state bears to other 
mental states of the person which has that belief. According to the Fregean, MOPs are those 
components of the content of a belief that secures that it has a functional role in accord with the 
foregoing constraints. Of course, the Fregean will ultimately have to provide us with a metaphysical 
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account of what, exactly, MOPs are.8 For our purposes, we will not worry too much about the 
metaphysics, and simply take MOPs to be whatever it is that plays the MOP-role; that is, whatever it is 
that meets the foregoing constraints, be they individual concepts, dossiers of information, conceptual roles of 
expressions in a language of thought, or what have you.9 For now, note that it is plausible that on any way 
of spelling out the notion, MOPs will likely be highly idiosyncratic and vary significantly from agent 
to agent. MOPs are introduced to capture an agent’s ways of thinking of the objects, properties, and 
relations her belief concerns and there are, of course, many (many) cognitively non-equivalent ways 
of thinking of one and the same object and/or property.  
 Fregeans can, and should, allow that a MOP can be irreducibly object-, or property-, 
dependent, and cannot be identified, or individuated, without citing the object, or property, of which 
it is an MOP.10 As Schiffer points out, a Fregean who takes this line can hold that ‘the Fregean 
proposition <m, m'>, where m is an x-dependent mode of presentation of x, and m' is an F-ness-
dependent mode of presentation of F-ness, would be . . . truth-conditionally equivalent to, but 
distinct from the direct-reference theorist’s Russellian singular proposition <x, Fness>’ (140). The 
Fregean who accepts this suggestion should claim that many of our demonstrative and/or 
perceptual beliefs essentially involve such object-dependent MOPs.  
 Returning to (1)–(4), it is clear that the Fregeans can countenance an abundance of extremely 
fine-grained, object-dependent propositions concerning me, Ray, to the effect that Ray is hungry. 
Indeed, there are as many such Fregean propositions as there are cognitively non-equivalent ways of 
thinking of me. (Within this plurality of propositions there will be a Fregean proposition that 
contains a first-person, self-conscious, MOP that I, and I alone, might think of myself under.) What 
 
8 See Schiffer (1987a), Chapter 3, for some of the difficulties in saying what, exactly, MOPs are.   
9 For the record, I am sympathetic to the view that MOPs are to be understood in terms of the conceptual 
roles of expressions in Mentalese, where conceptual role is modeled in the manner suggested by Field (1977). 
10 See, for example, Bach (1987), Chapter One, Evans (1982), McDowell (1984) for more on de re MOPs. 
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the Fregean cannot give us, however, is a proposition with Schiffer’s relativity feature. Here is 
Schiffer: 
 
If an x-dependent proposition has the relativity feature, then there is no one mode of 
presentation of x under which everyone who entertains the proposition must think of x, 
whenever or wherever the entertaining takes place. Fregean propositions, however, do require 
each x-dependent proposition to contain a mode of presentation of x under which anyone, at any time or place, 
who entertains the proposition must think of x. (140, italics mine) 
 
Not only can the Fregean not provide us with a proposition that has Schiffer’s relativity feature, the 
italicized requirement above makes it independently doubtful that the semantic content of (virtually) 
any literal utterance containing a referring expression is ever an object-dependent Fregean 
proposition. As Schiffer put it elsewhere, the real problem is that: 
 
. . . while understanding what’s said in an utterance typically constrains how the 
communicators must think of the things the utterance is about, it’s extremely rare for such 
understanding to require them to think of those things in exactly the same way . . . what is 
the mode of presentation of Mexico City and the one mode of presentation of Los Angeles 
under which you and I are thinking of those two cities when I say to you, ‘Mexico City has a 
much worse smog problem than Los Angeles.’?11 
 
 
11 This quote is from Schiffer’s 2004 lecture notes at NYU on the material that ultimately led to the 2005 
paper that we have been discussing. Also, see Heck (2002) for an excellent discussion of this point in 
connection to indexicals and demonstratives (more on Heck’s views on these topics momentarily).   
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The worry here is completely general. While it is plausible enough that when I think of, say, the 
country-singer, Toby Keith, I am doing so under some or other specific MOP, it is implausible in 
the extreme to suppose that I might mean—literally, or otherwise—a Fregean proposition with that 
MOP as a constituent when I utter, say, (14): 
 
 14. Toby Keith is from Oklahoma. 
 
Insofar as I can reasonably expect to be understood in uttering (14), I cannot mean, or intend to 
convey, any such proposition—how could I? On what grounds could I expect you, or anyone else, 
to come to recognize the particular MOP under which I think of Toby Keith on the basis of my 
utterance of (14), and the facts concerning the common ground between us? The things we mean, 
and say, are not fine-grained Fregean propositions.  
 Returning to Schiffer’s puzzle: suffice it to say (for now), no Fregean proposition has the 
relativity feature. Moreover, in light of Schiffer’s more general worry, I submit that Fregean 
propositions are not plausible candidates for being the contents of virtually any assertoric utterance, 
much less those that exhibit the relativity feature.   
 
4. The “No-Semantic-Content” Theory 
Neither Fregean propositions, nor the Russellian propositions favored by the DR theorist, have the 
relativity feature. In coming to appreciate why this is so, we have been reminded of some 
independent worries with both of these versions of the face-value theory. If we are to explain away 
Schiffer’s relativity feature, we should try to do so in a way that does not have the problems of these 
familiar versions of the face-value theory. On the one hand, we would like an account of semantic 
content, and what is said, that allows for more fineness of grain than the account offered by the DR-
 16 
theorist—an account that is, at least potentially, sensitive to how our audiences must think of the 
objects, and properties, our utterances concern if they are to understand us. (The hope is that such 
an account could allow for—among other things—the possibility that, say, a literal utterance of ‘Lois 
believes that Superman flies, but does not believe that Kent does’ could be true.) On the other hand, 
however, we need contents that are not nearly as fine-grained as those on offer from the proponent 
of the traditional Fregean account: those propositions are so fine-grained as to be all but 
incommunicable, and that is obviously not a good feature for semantic contents to have.  
 The prospects for giving such an account might seem extremely bleak. At this point in the 
dialectic, we no longer have Russellian propositions to appeal to, and we have just seen that Fregean 
propositions are not especially promising candidates for being semantic contents. If the Russellian is 
too liberal in its requirements on grasping, the Fregean is too demanding. It’s too easy to share 
contents on the Russellian view, and too hard—almost impossible in many cases—for the Fregean. 
 Before we despair we should first consider a neo-Fregean response to Schiffer’s puzzle 
concerning the relativity feature that he calls the “no-semantic-content theory”: 
 
One way of attempting to [explain away the relativity feature] . . . is to deny that any 
proposition is the semantic content of my utterance and to hold instead that understanding 
the utterance requires me and my hearer to entertain different but related propositions. That 
is to say, as regards my utterance of ‘I’m F’, the no-semantic-content theory holds, first, that 
my literal and serious utterance of ‘I’m F’ has no semantic content—that is, that in uttering 
the sentence I’m not saying any proposition which conforms to the meaning of that 
sentence—but, second, my utterance (i) has a truth-value; (ii) is fully understood by me and 
my audience; (iii) is such that that understanding requires me and my audience to think of 
me in different ways (I, but not you, must think of me under the self-conscious mode of 
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presentation); and (iv) does conform to the meaning of the sentence type ‘I’m F’ (it’s just 
that that meaning can’t be a propositional form which requires the literal speaker who utters 
the sentence to mean a proposition of that form). (143–144). 
 
This response is, I submit, the response for the theorist who holds that the objects of our thoughts 
are fine-grained, Fregean proposition. In what follows, let’s call any theorist who holds that (a) the 
objects of our cognitive attitudes are Fregean propositions, (b) but who—in the sense of the 
foregoing quote—denies that such propositions are the contents of our assertoric speech acts, an 
enlightened Fregean (or a ‘FregeanE’, for short).  
 Hints of such an account are littered throughout the writings of neo-Fregeans.12 McDowell, 
for example, claims that a proponent of Fregean propositions can, and should, deny that 
“communication must involve a sharing of [Fregean] thoughts between the communicator and 
audience” (1998: 222).13 Rather, the Fregean should hold that successful communication requires 
“not shared thoughts but different thoughts that are mutually known to stand in a suitable relation 
of correspondence” (McDowll 1998: 222).   
And while McDowell refrains from explicitly denying that literal utterances involving 
demonstratives, and/or indexicals, fail to have semantic content, Heck (2002) comes much closer: 
 
12 Here, I have in mind theorists such as Gareth Evans (1982), Richard Heck (2002), Martin Davies (1982), 
Graeme Forbes (1987) and (1990), and John McDowell (1998). A would-be proponent of the no-semantic-
content thesis will also find considerable inspiration in Schiffer’s own 1981 paper entitled  ‘Indexicals and the 
Theory of Reference.’ In that work, Schiffer argued that while the Frege/Russell theory of content is plausible 
as an account of “the thought in the mind of a speaker using a singular term” (‘Indexicals and the Theory of 
Refernece,’ 49), it fails as an account of the things we mean, and say, by uttering sentences containing 
indexicals and demonstratives. Schiffer argued that while the semantic content of a literal utterance of the 
form ‘t is G’ (where ‘t’ is a referring expression) will be a singular, Russellian proposition, such a proposition 
is not, and could not be, the “complete content” of the belief in the mind of the speaker making that 
utterance. On this view—like the “enlightened Fregean” view to be sketched below—there is a fundamental 
asymmetry between the things we say, and mean, and the contents of our beliefs. See Neale (this volume) for 
an interesting discussion of Schiffer’s account of speaker-reference offered in that paper.   
13 Schiffer (2005) also cites both the McDowell material and the quote by Heck to follow, as well.   
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If one really wants to find something to call the meaning [of such an utterance], then 
perhaps what is common to the cognitive values the utterance has for different speakers is 
as good a choice as any. But why do we want to find something to call the meaning? What 
we (relatively) uncontroversially have are speakers who associate Thoughts [i.e., specific 
thought contents] with utterances and restrictions on how the different Thoughts must be 
related if they are to communicate successfully . . . (Heck 2002: 27) 
 
(Here, Heck presumably means ‘the semantic content of an utterance’ in speaking of “the meaning” 
thereof, and by “thoughts” he means Fregean propositions.) For the FregeanE, the problems posed 
by Schiffer’s relativity feature are not so much a worry for the Fregean account of indexical or 
demonstrative thoughts; rather, they are problems for overly simplistic ‘thought-sharing’ conceptions 
of linguistic communication.    
 While McDowell, Heck, and other neo-Fregeans have been moved towards the no-semantic-
content account from problems posed by indexicals and demonstratives, such an account should be 
of much more general appeal to the fan of Fregean propositions in light of the worry raised in 
Section Three: namely, that such propositions are virtually always too fine-grained to be plausible 
candidates for being the contents of assertion. A fan of Fregean propositions should be every bit as 
sympathetic to the no-semantic-content account for utterances involving, say, proper names as they 
are for indexicals. That is, the FregeanE should hold a speaker will no more mean, or assert, a 
Fregean proposition by uttering, say,  ‘Mexico City has a much worse smog problem than Los 
Angeles’ than she will by an utterance of (1), (5), or any other of the cases we have considered 
involving indexicals and demonstratives.  
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 The fan of Fregean propositions who adopts the no-semantic-content theory will hold that 
successful linguistic communication can be achieved by the speaker and her audience coming to 
have, distinct, yet appropriately related Fregean thoughts. What exactly could this amount to? 
Insofar as understanding a speaker S’s utterance requires (at least minimally) recognizing her 
meaning-intentions, we are owed a story regarding S’s meaning intentions that allows that it is 
indeed possible for S’s audience to understand her by entertaining something suitably similar to the 
Fregean thought she ‘had in mind’ in producing her utterance. In the case of my utterance of (1), for 
example, the content of my meaning intention cannot simply be that you entertain a thought suitably 
similar to my thought p, where p is the Fregean content of my first person thought. Recognition of that 
intention would require you to do something that Frege’s account of indexical thoughts all but 
entails cannot be done—namely, it requires you to share the content of my private, un-shareable 
thought. What then should the FregeanE say?  
 Stepping back, the FregeanE holds that many literal utterances will fail to have a ‘semantic 
content’ in the sense in which that notion was introduced in Section One. She will hold that, in 
typical cases, there is no proposition of the kind she is willing to countenance (i.e. Fregean 
propositions) that a speaker means, or asserts. But crucially, there is nothing to preclude her from 
theorizing about ‘what’ the speaker meant—literally, or otherwise—by an utterance so long as what 
is meant/asserted is not, itself, a Fregean proposition.14 Whatever the things we mean turn out to be, 
they had better be such that different speakers can entertain, or believe, them in virtue of having 
distinct Fregean thoughts if they are going to be of help to Schiffer’s worries concerning the 
relativity feature.  
 
14 Heck, as we have seen, allows for this possibility, but claims that the Fregean does not need any notion of 
semantic content (at least in utterances involving demonstratives and indexicals). 
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 There are several possibilities here, but I’ll just suggest the one to which I am most partial.15 
Consider (15): 
 
 15.  Fichte was born in Upper Lusatia. 
 
Notice that a Fregean proposition might have any number of properties. It might have the property 
of being Barack Obama’s favorite proposition, it might have the property of being controversial 
among people who own pugs, and so on. A Fregean proposition might also, of course, have the 
complex property of being about a certain man, Fichte, and true only if he was born in Upper 
Lusatia. Call this property Y. On behalf of the FregeanE, I suggest that in uttering ‘Fichte was born 
in Upper Lusatia.’ the speaker does not mean any particular Fregean proposition; rather what she is 
putting forward is Y. So long as her audience comes to entertain a suitably similar Fregean 
proposition—namely, one that is Y—on the basis of her utterance, understanding can be achieved. 
This thing—the Fregean proposition-type Y—is, for all intents and purposes, equivalent to the singular 
proposition <Fichte, the property of being born in Upper Lusatia>. But there is nothing to preclude 
the FregeranE from holding that, in a particular context of utterance, the relevant proposition-type is 
more finely-grained: perhaps the relevant proposition-type in question is one that is just like Y, 
except further requires thinking of Fichte by that name, or as a philosopher, or what have you. 
 Interestingly, the FregeanE can also allow that in some cases the relevant type is not, in any 
sense, equivalent to a proposition of any stripe. This would occur when the speaker’s audience might 
fully understand her utterance in virtue of coming to entertain any one, or more, Fregean 
propositions which themselves have different possible worlds truth-conditions. Elsewhere, I have argued that 
 
15 I develop this suggestion in my (2010) and (2012).  
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such cases abound.16 But for present purposes, let’s only consider the simpler cases in which each of 
the Fregean propositions of the relevant type have the same modal profile. In these cases, at least, 
we might claim that a literal utterance in which a speaker means/asserts such a Fregean proposition-
type is true just in case each of the propositions of that type are themselves true.  
 Returning to the first example in Section One, the theorist who takes up the suggestion just 
offered might hold that in uttering (1) I literally meant a Fregean proposition-type, F, instantiated by 
all and only those Fregean propositions with the modal profile of <Ray, the property of being 
hungry>, intending that there be some or other thought of that type that my audience come to 
entertain on the basis of my utterance. Moreover, given our mutual knowledge of the character* of 
‘I,’ it is plausible that I will further conventionally signal that the particular Fregean thought of the F-
type that, as it were, ‘prompted’ my utterance was an essentially first person one. In order to 
understand my utterance of (1) it is not enough for you to come to have a thought concerning me to 
the effect Ray is hungry. Additionally, you must recognize that I am, by my choice of the first person 
pronoun ‘I,’ intentionally providing you evidence concerning the specific proposition of F-type that 
lies behind my utterance; namely, a first-person, de se, thought concerning myself. Hence, if you 
understand my utterance you will both (i) come to entertain a Fregean thought of the intended F-
type, and (ii) recognize that the particular Fregean thought of that type that prompted my utterance 
was itself essentially de se. Regarding (ii), notice that you can know that I have a de se thought of the 
F-kind even if you yourself can’t have the specific Fregean thought of that kind that you know to 
have prompted my utterance. More generally, on the suggestion on offer, what a speaker 
means/says is a property of Fregean propositions; her utterance is understood only if her audience comes 
 
16 See my (2010) for such cases, and a more general argument that speaker-meaning is not a propositional 
attitude.    
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to suitably entertain some one, or more, propositions that have the property in question. Such 
Fregean proposition-types are, as it were, ‘contents’ for the would-be proponent of the no-semantic-
content account.  
 The no-semantic-content theory should (I hope) be of interest to any fan of Fregean 
propositions. But as we are about to see, any friend of Fregean propositions who adopts this view 
has much, much work to do.  
 
5. Schiffer’s Worry for the No-Semantic-Content View  
Schiffer is skeptical that any version of the no-semantic-content line will solve his puzzle; indeed, he 
offers a worry that challenges the very coherence of the no-semantic-content account. The principal 
worry Schiffer has is how to square the claim that, for example, my utterance of ‘I am hungry’ does 
not express a (Fregean) proposition with the claim that (seemingly) there is one thing—namely, that I 
am hungry—that (i) I said by my utterance, and (ii) that we both believe (144). Reconsider (2) and (3): 
 
 2. By uttering (1), I said that I am hungry. 
 3. I believe that I am hungry.  
 
Presumably, the FregeanE will hold that in (2) the that-clause does not refer to a Fregean proposition. 
The alternative view—that the that-clause in (2) does refer to a Fregean proposition p, but p cannot 
be the semantic content of my utterance of (1)—is untenable (145). The crucial question then is how 
any theorist who thinks that believing is a relation between agents and propositions—Fregean or 
otherwise—can coherently hold that the that-clause in (2) does not refer to, or specify, such a 
proposition. Given the parity of form between (2) and (3), such a theorist would have to also hold 
that the that-clause in (3) does not refer to a Fregean proposition either—for that matter, it must be 
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that that-clauses never refer to the propositions we believe. The FregeanE theorist who is driven to 
this position must tell us how a report of the form ‘A believes that S’ can possibly be true if the 
relevant that-clause does not, and cannot, specify something that A believes.   
 The challenge is daunting, and I am honestly not sure how to best try to address it. As far as 
I can see, however, the FregeanE’s best response to this challenge will involve denying the 
presupposition of his question. That is to say, such a theorist should hold that even in true belief-
reports of the form ‘S believes that p’ we do not specify what S believes. Ever.17  
 This might initially sound like a very unpromising line of thought, but any fan of Fregean 
propositions should be sympathetic. Why? Recall the worry we considered in Section Three 
regarding the Fregean theory of speech act content. If the traditional Fregean theory of speech act 
content were correct, then a speaker who literally utters ‘Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ will have 
asserted some, or other, proposition containing some specific MOP of Toby. This, as we saw 
before, is implausible. Notice, however, that an analog of this same problem arises equally with 
regard to belief reports. On the traditional, face-value, Fregean account of belief reports, a report 
such as (16) is correct just in case the that-clause in question refers to a Fregean proposition that is 
among the things the subject—in this case, my little sister, Frances—believes: 
 
 16. Frances believes that Toby Keith is from Oklahoma.  
 
The problem here is that I can no more literally refer to a Fregean, MOP-involving proposition by 
the that-clause in (16) than I can mean, or say, such a proposition by uttering ‘Toby Keith is from 
Oklahoma.’ Though I know my sister very well, I do not know the particular MOP under which she 
 
17 The primary inspiration for the suggestion that follows comes from Bach’s seminal (1997) piece entitled 
‘Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?’ See the citations in fn. 19, as well.   
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thinks of Toby Keith (and this is certainly not because she hasn’t spoken about him enough to me). 
But even if I did know the exact MOP under which she thinks of the famous country-singer—say 
MOP4,567—I would still not be in a position to refer it in uttering (16). What a speaker can refer to in 
the course of uttering u is constrained by what she can reasonably expect her audience to recognize 
her to have meant on the basis of u. In the case of (16), I have no reason whatsoever to suppose that 
my utterance could put my audience in a position to recognize any particular MOP of Toby that 
Frances is employing in her belief. (Further, my audience can perfectly well understand my utterance 
of (16) even if they know less than me about the exact MOP relevant to Frances’s belief.) If the 
Fregean version of the face-value theory were correct, however, my inability to refer to any 
particular MOP should preclude me from being able to truly utter (16).18  
 If the foregoing objection is correct, the traditional Fregean account of belief-reports is in 
trouble. This is not, however, yet to claim that the Fregean metaphysics of belief fails. That is, believing 
might be a relation between an agent and a Fregean proposition even if that-clauses in true belief-
reports never refer to, or specify, such propositions. How might this go? 
 The FregeanE accepts the metaphysical thesis that believing is a relation between agents and 
Fregean propositions. If this metaphysical thesis is correct, then (16), if true, entails that there is 
something that Frances believes, this ‘something’ being a Fregean proposition. But obviously, the 
belief-report in (16) tells us more than just this. If (16) is true, we also know quite a bit about the 
Fregean proposition that Frances believes: among other things, it is a Fregean proposition true at a 
world w just in cases Toby Keith was born in Oklahoma in w. Moreover, in a particular context, 
mutual knowledge concerning my sister’s epistemic situation regarding Toby Keith might place 
further constraints on the nature of the Fregean proposition she believes—for example, that she 
 
18 See Schiffer (1993: 109–110) in connection to that-clause reference. See my (2012) for further discussion.   
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must think of him as a country singer, a gentleman of the South, or what have you. In a sense to be 
presently elaborated, the neo-Fregean should claim that the that-clause in (13) serves to indirectly, and 
partially, characterize the Fregean proposition that Frances believes.19   
 Building on these observations, the proponent of the no-semantic-content theory should 
hold that, to a very rough and ready first approximation, the logical form of (16) is given by (16b): 
 
 16b. $p (Fp & Believes(Frances, p)) 
 
where ‘p’ ranges over Fregean propositions and F is a contextually relevant property of such 
propositions. But prima facie, this suggestion makes the question regarding the semantic function of 
the that-clause in (16) even more puzzling. Where did the that-clause go? What contribution could 
‘that Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ be making to the logical form given in (13b)?    
Perhaps the FregeanE will find some inspiration in a proposal by Francois Recanati (2004) 
according to which that-clauses are analyzed as existential quantifiers. According to this proposal, ‘that 
Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ has the same type of semantic value, as for example, ‘some country 
singer.’ On standard accounts, in ‘some country singer,’ ‘some’ serves to introduce the existential 
quantifier, and ‘country singer’ then provides a restriction on the quantifier so introduced. That-
clauses are claimed to function analogously: in a particular context of utterance, the embedded 
sentence in ‘that Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ will have a certain semantic content, F, that serves 
as a restriction on the existential quantifier introduced by ‘that.’ The that-clause, qua existential 
quantifier, can then combine with a monadic predicate such as ‘Frances believes x’—a predicate true 
 
19 In addition to Bach’s article cited in fn. 17, and Recanati’s (2004) piece discussed below, see Graff Fara 
(2003), Forbes (1987), McKinsey (1994), Pollock (1982), Schiffer (1977) and (1978), and Shier (1993) and 
(1996) for further motivation for such a partial characterization account of propositional attitude reports. 
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of all and only the propositions Frances believes—to deliver the desired logical form—(16b). On 
this proposal, that-clauses are, in effect, treated as properties of monadic propositional attitude properties. In 
the case of (16), the that-clause is claimed to express a property instantiated by Frances just in case 
there is at least one proposition that she believes possessing the contextually specified property F. 
The compositional details of this suggestion might be worked out in any number of different ways.20 
For now, however, the point to focus on is this: if Recanati’s suggestion is correct, the Fregean who 
has been led to this point will have a story regarding that-clauses that is compatible with her claim 
that (16b) is the logical form of (16). The existential quantification over propositions in (16b) is 
accounted for by the (putative) fact that that-clauses themselves are restricted quantifiers.  
 
20 On standard accounts, ‘some country singer’ is analyzed as expressing the property: 
(*) lQ$x[Country-singer(x) & Q(x)] 
This second-order property—the property a property P has when P is possessed by at least one entity that is a 
country singer—is a generalized quantifier. If we abstract away further, we can then isolate the distinct 
contributions of ‘some’ and ‘country singer’ in (*) revealing that ‘some’ serves to introduce an existential 
quantifier, and ‘country singer,’ in effect, provides restriction on the quantifier so-introduced. On this 
analysis, ‘some’ is the following function from properties to generalized quantifiers, such as (*): 
(*) lPlQ$x[P(x) & Q(x)] 
Modifying Recanati’s suggestion for our current purposes, the suggestion would run ‘Frances believes p’ 
expresses a one-place property of propositions, a property true of all and only the Fregean propositions she 
believes. ‘That Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ is also claimed to be a second-order property such as (a) 
(below). It is a property of monadic propositional attitude properties—properties, like (b), that are true of 
things just in case they bear the relevant propositional attitude relation to a proposition with the contextually-
specified property, F.   
 (a)  lXlx[($p)(Fp & X(x,p))]     
 (b)  lx[($p)(Fp & Believes(x,p))]  
Thus, in (13) the embedded sentence ‘Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ (plus various contextual factors) serves 
to specify precisely which property of propositions gets assigned to F. We can isolate the contribution of 
‘that’ as follows: 
 (c)  lφlXlx[($p)(φp & X(x,p))]) 
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Recanati’s general idea is that in a particular context of utterance the embedded sentence in 
‘that Toby Keith is from Oklahoma’ will have a certain semantic content F. The that-clause then 
serves to quantify over propositions that have that semantic content. Different versions of the view 
will then arise depending upon what one says about the semantic content of the sentence embedded 
in the that-clause. For example, if one were originally sympathetic to a DR account of the semantic 
content of ‘Toby Keith is from Oklahoma,’ the relevant that-clause could be taken as quantifying 
over an equivalence class of Fregean propositions, all of which are true at a world w, just in case the 
singular proposition <Toby Keith, the property of being from Oklahoma> is true at w. 
More plausibly, however, a proponent of Recanati’s suggestion might allow that the semantic 
content of the embedded sentence is ‘pragmatically enriched’ in the context of utterance so as to 
have the force of something akin to ‘Toby Keith, the country singer, is from Oklahoma.’ This latter 
move would allow the theorist to claim that, for example, (16) can differ in truth-value from (17), 
even though Toby Keith is Mr. Covel: 
 
 17. Frances believes that Mr. Covel is from Oklahoma.  
 
The general idea might be spelled out in any number of different ways. The crucial point for now is 
that Recanati’s suggestion would, if correct, provide the proponent of Fregean propositions a story 
regarding the semantic function of that-clauses that is compatible with the desired logical form of 
(16), viz. (16b).  
 Unfortunately for the FregeanE, Recanati’s suggestion is deeply problematic when we 




 18. Frances meant/said that Toby Keith is from Oklahoma.  
 
If that-clauses are uniformly analyzed as existential quantifiers, we should expect the logical form of 
(18) to be analogous to that of the desired logical form of (18) given in (18b): 
 
 18b.  $p (Fp & Meant/Said(Frances, p)) 
 
But, as Schiffer once pointed out in connection to a similar suggestion due to Graeme Forbes 
(1987), this prediction is unacceptable.21 Suppose that I offer the meaning attribution in (18) on the 
basis of Frances’s uttering ‘He is from Oklahoma’ while pointing to a picture of Toby wearing a 
cowboy hat. As we have already seen in Section Three, Frances could not have meant any particular 
Fregean proposition by her utterance of ‘He is from Oklahoma.’ Hence, (18) should be false. More 
generally, given that the contents of our speech acts cannot be identified with Fregean propositions, 
all reports of the form ‘S said/meant that p’ should be false. But as this is not a desirable result, the 
FregeanE needs an alternative story regarding the semantic function of that-clauses compatible with 
her guiding thought that belief-reports only partially characterize the Fregean propositions we 
believe—an alternative story compatible with her desire to hold that (15b) is the logical form of (15), 
but which avoids the foregoing problem regarding attributions of meaning. She needs an account 
that is compatible with holding that believing is a relation to a Fregean proposition, but saying, and 
meaning, are not. What might such an account look like? 
At this point, I humbly propose that we reconsider the suggestion that I made on behalf of 
the FregeanE regarding what we mean, and assert (Section Four). First notice that if (i) meaning, saying, 
 
21 See Schiffer (1992), note 10.  
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and the like are fundamentally relations to Fregean proposition-types, and (ii) it is (even in principle) 
possible to report the full content of a speech act by an attribution such as (18), it follows that the 
orthodox Fregean view of that-clauses is false. What then might the that-clause in a true says-that 
report such as (18) pick out if not a proposition? Perhaps, we should take the that-clause in (18) to 
be expressing a two-place relation between speaker and a proposition-type, say F, which is the semantic 
value of the that-clause: 
 
 18c.  Says (Frances, F) 
 
In this case, perhaps F is a property instantiated by all and only those Fregean propositions true at a 
world w just in case Toby Keith is from Oklahoma at w and which requires thinking of Toby as a 
country singer. The proponent of Fregean propositions who adopts this suggestion regarding the 
logical form of meaning attributions can avoid the problem we encountered for the Recanati-
inspired representation of (18).     
How, if at all, can the suggestion that that-clauses denote properties of Fregean propositions 
be squared with the desired logical form of (15), i.e., (15b)? The FregeanE might claim that the 
similarity between (15) and (18) is to be explained by the fact that in both reports the that-clause 
picks out a proposition-type F. But while ‘says’ can be analyzed as a two-place relation between 
agent and the proposition-type supplied the that-clause, ‘believes’ cannot. After all, according to the 
FregeanE, the belief-relation is fundamentally a relation between agents and Fregean propositions, 
not properties thereof. In my view, the Fregean should claim that the underlying metaphysical 
difference between saying and believing engenders a crucial semantic difference between attributions of 
meaning and belief: whereas a report such as (18) is true just in case Frances stands in the saying-
relation to the proposition-type F, (15) is true if, and only if Frances believes some one, or more 
 30 
propositions of the type F. ‘Believes,’ unlike ‘says,’ forces existential quantification over propositions 
that are of the type denoted by the that-clause.   
To illustrate the general idea here, it is helpful to consider a singular term that explicitly 
seems to refer to a type (or kind). Suppose that while we are sitting in the dog park at Washington 
Square, I utter (19) while gesturing towards a particular English bulldog: 
 
  19. Pugs are more widespread than that type of dog.  
 
What, if anything, have I referred to by my use of ‘that type of dog?’ Prima facie, I have referred to a 
certain type of dog—namely, the English bulldog—by way of an instance of that type. The two-place 
predicate ‘_ is more widespread than _’ does not express a relation between individuals, or even 
pluralities of individuals, for that matter. It makes no sense to suggest that, for example, *Fido is more 
widespread than Spike, or *Eighteen pugs are more widespread that seventeen bulldogs. Rather, ‘_ is more 
widespread than _’ expresses a relation between kinds, or types, of things; in the case of (19), a 
relation between pugs and English bulldogs. 
 Suppose that a bit later during our visit to the dog park, I utter (20) while gesturing towards 
the same English bulldog: 
 
 20. Mary owns that type of dog.   
 
Taking (19) as our model, we would expect that my use of ‘that type of dog’ also refers to a certain 
type, or kind, of thing—namely, the English bulldog.  Notice that in uttering (20), however, I most 
certainly did not claim that Mary owns the kind the English bulldog; rather, I have claimed that there is a 
dog of a certain kind that Mary owns. Assuming that both ‘Mary’ and ‘that type of dog’ are functioning as 
 31 
singular terms, where could the existential quantification be coming from? Presumably, the 
existential quantification arises from the interaction of ‘owns’ and ‘that type of dog.’ Oftentimes, when 
a type/kind-referring singular term is in direct object position of a verb that does not itself express a 
relation to types/kinds, such as ‘owns,’ an existential reading is generated. Though linguists debate 
on how exactly the interaction of ‘owns’ and the type/kind-referring singular term gives rise to the 
relevant existential interpretation, no one denies that the phenomenon occurs.22 The theorist who 
has come this far should claim that since believes is itself a relation between agents and Fregean 
propositions (not types thereof)—a belief-report such as (15) generates existential quantification 
over propositions of the type specified by the that-clause. On her account, ‘that’-clauses univocally 
denote Fregean-proposition-types; ‘believes’ then functions a bit like ‘owns’ in (20), whereas ‘says,’ a 
bit more like ‘is more widespread than’ in (19).    
 It should (I hope) be apparent why the view just sketched ought to be attractive to the 
theorist who thinks that Fregean propositions are the objects of our beliefs, and other of our 
cognitive attitudes. It should be equally apparent, however, that the view just sketched invites many 
(many) worries of its own. Among other things, the Fregean must give up the standard treatment of 
that-clauses enshrined in the face-value theory (Section One). Hence, the FregeanE will have to show 
how, if at all, her view can accommodate the data that originally motivated the face-value account of 
‘that’-clauses. For example, our discussion of the asymmetry between saying and believing 




22 The relevant linguistics literature is vast. As a starting point, the introduction to The Generic Book, edited by 
Krifka et al, is especially helpful. See Carlson (1977) and Chierchia (1998) for two classic discussions of 
reference to kinds/types. Also see Section Four of Ostertag (2012) for a very helpful discussion of some of 
the complexities of type/kind referring singular terms. 
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Mary believes everything John said.  ("x)(Said(j, x) ® Believes(m, x)) 
John said that snow is white.    Said(j, p) 
Mary believes that snow is white.  Believes(m,p) 
 
(B) 
John said everything Mary believes.  ("x)(Believes(m, x) ®  Said(j, x))  
Mary believes that snow is white.   Believes(m, p) 
John said that snow is white.   Said(j, p) 
 
If the face-value account is correct, these inferences instantiate the logical forms displayed to their 
right, and hence are valid. Since the FregeanE gives an asymmetric account of ‘says’ and ‘believes,’ 
one might reasonably wonder whether she can capture the apparent validity of such arguments. If 
the FregeanE account is to be maintained, the seeming validity of these inferences must somehow be 
explained away in a manner compatible with the claimed asymmetry between ‘believes’ and ‘says’.  I 
am not, at present, confident that such an error-theoretic account can be given.  But given the many 
virtues of the FregeanE account, I hope my pessimism on this score turns out to have been 
misguided.   
 
6. Conclusion 
We began with Schiffer’s observation that many of the things we say, and believe, seem to have a 
certain feature that is incompatible with the traditional, face-value, Fregean and Russellian accounts 
of propositional content. In the course of trying to explain away the relativity feature we have been 
led a considerable distance from both of these traditional accounts. According to the no-semantic-
content theory just sketched, believes, entertains, and other of our cognitive attitudes are relations 
 33 
between agents and fine-grained Fregean propositions. Fregean propositions are not, however, the 
contents of our assertoric speech acts—rather what we mean, and say, are kinds thereof.   
While we have just seen how one might coherently hold such a view, more work must first be 
done to show that the view is, in fact, plausible. Since the theorist who has been led to this point must 
give up the face-value theory, she incurs the debt of explaining away the data that Schiffer, and 
others, have adduced in its favor. Given the difficulty of this task, we might need to reconsider our 
starting point. That is, maybe Schiffer is right and the relativity feature simply cannot be explained 
away. If so, this would mean that we would need a novel account of propositional content radically 
unlike the traditional versions of the face-value theory due to Frege and Russell. As it turns out, 
Schiffer indeed has such a view to offer, but I will let him tell you about that.*   
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